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The United States has used tax credits and mandates to promote ethanol production. To 
offset the tax credits received by imported ethanol, the United States instituted an import 
tariff. This study provides insights about the quantitative nature of a U.S. trade policy that 
would establish a free-market price for ethanol, given the U.S. ethanol mandate and tax 
credit. The theoretical results from a horizontally related ethanol-gasoline partial 
equilibrium model show that the United States should provide an import subsidy rather 
than impose a tariff. The empirical results quantify that this import subsidy is 9 cents, 
instead of a 57 cent import tariff, per gallon of ethanol. 
 





The United States and Brazil are the world’s largest ethanol producers. In 2008, the United 
States produced 9 billion gallons of ethanol, while Brazil produced 6.5 billion gallons; 
together they accounted for 89% of total world production [Renewable Fuels Association 
(RFA), 2009]. In the United States, corn is the major feedstock for ethanol production; in 
Brazil, the major feedstock is sugarcane. The U.S. government has promoted ethanol produc-
tion through several policies: a tax credit, the ethanol mandate, and an import tariff.
1 Under 
the 2008 Farm Bill, the tax credit, a subsidy given to blenders of ethanol and gasoline, was set 
at $0.46 per gallon of ethanol. The ethanol mandate requires blenders to use a specified aggre- 
gate volume of ethanol in their gasoline blends. The mandated volume for 2008 was 9 billion 
gallons and will increase to 15 billion gallons in 2022 (RFA, 2009). 
  Although the tax credit was intended only for domestically produced ethanol, it also 
applies to imported ethanol because blenders cannot determine the origin of the ethanol they 
use. Consequently, to offset the tax credit accruing to imported ethanol, the U.S. government 
instituted an import tariff. The United States justifies the ethanol import tariff by claiming 
that since imports receive the benefits of the tax credit,
2 a tariff is needed to offset these 
benefits, and eliminating the tariff will hurt the domestic ethanol industry (RFA, 2007). 
Furthermore, the United States claims that the tariff is permissible under current World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules because U.S. tariffs on ethanol have not been contested in the 
Uruguay Round (Motaal, 2008) and that tariffs may not face a steeper cut even if a new WTO 
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1 Brazil does not currently subsidize its sugar-based ethanol, even though it did provide government support during the infancy 
stage of the ethanol industry (van den Wall Bake et al., 2008). 
     
2 Since the tax credit is given to domestic production and imports, and thus does not discriminate against imports, it does not violate 
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  Currently, the U.S. import tariff on ethanol is effectively $0.57 per gallon and consists of a 
$0.54 specific tariff and a 2.5% ad valorem tariff (de Gorter, Just, and Tan, 2009). As a result, 
the import tariff exceeds the tax credit by 11 cents per gallon of ethanol. Recent studies have 
shown that the U.S. tariff restricts the amount of ethanol imports from Brazil, even though 
Brazil continues to have a significant comparative advantage in ethanol production (Elobeid 
and Tokgoz, 2006, 2008; Kojima, Mitchell, and Ward, 2007). The United States imported 
approximately 434 million gallons of ethanol from Brazil in 2008, representing only 6.8% of 
Brazilian production (RFA, 2009). Consequently, Brazil is considering filing a formal 
complaint with the WTO against the U.S. ethanol tariff (Klapper, 2008). This dispute has 
become even more complex because the WTO has not formulated rules to address biofuel 
policies. Subsidies and tariffs related to energy products are largely exempt from WTO 
regulations, and there is a lack of clarity as to whether biofuels are agricultural or industrial 
commodities (Motaal, 2008; Howse, van Bork, and Hebebrand, 2006). 
  As this dispute is unresolved, it is worth ascertaining the appropriate U.S. ethanol import 
policy given the U.S. tax credit and mandate. Specifically, this study's objective is to provide 
insights about the quantitative nature of a U.S. trade policy that would establish a free-market 
price for ethanol, given the U.S. ethanol tax credit and mandate. Our results show that the 
current U.S. tariff, which is 11 cents more than the tax credit, is punitive to Brazil, and the 
United States should in fact provide an import subsidy rather than impose an import tariff. 
Our findings are consistent with those reported in the literature on biofuel. For instance, de 
Gorter and Just (2008) conclude the U.S. policy hurts Brazilian ethanol producers and argue 
against the validity of the U.S. claim that an import tariff is needed to counteract the tax credit. 
De Gorter, Just, and Tan (2009) suggest the import tariff should be smaller than the tax credit, 
which would imply an import subsidy. Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) assert that the removal of 
the U.S. tax credit and import tariff would significantly increase ethanol imports. The current 
work differs from earlier studies by providing new insights about the level of the import tariff 




We develop a horizontally linked partial equilibrium model of ethanol and gasoline for three 
regions: the United States, Brazil, and the rest of the world (ROW).
3 The United States 
produces and utilizes fossil fuel (gasoline) and ethanol. Since the U.S. demand for fossil fuel 
and ethanol exceeds supply, it imports both fuels. The United States imports fossil fuel from 
oil-producing countries in the ROW, and U.S. excess demand equals ROW excess supply: 
(1)         ,
UU UU RR RR
GG GG GG GG DP SP SP DP   
where U
G D is U.S. demand for gasoline, U
G S is U.S. supply of gasoline, R
G S
 is ROW supply of 
gasoline, R
G D
 is ROW demand for gasoline, U
G P is U.S. price of gasoline, and R
G P is ROW price 
of gasoline. Spatial price arbitrage between U.S. and ROW gasoline prices requires that: 
(2)  ,
UR
GG G PP T   
                                                 
3 See de Gorter and Just (2008, 2009) for a two-country (the United States and Brazil) model that incorporates U.S. biofuel 
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where TG is the transport cost of gasoline between the ROW and the United States. The 
United States imports ethanol from Brazil, and U.S. excess demand equals Brazil’s excess 
supply: 
(3)         
,, ,
UU C UU P B BB B
E EE EE E EE DP SP SP DP    
where U
E D is U.S. ethanol demand, U
E S is U.S. ethanol supply, B
E S  is Brazilian ethanol supply, 
DB
E is Brazilian ethanol demand, , UC
E P is U.S. ethanol consumer/demand price, ,P U
E P is U.S. 
ethanol producer/supply price, and B
E P is Brazilian ethanol price. The United States imposes a 




E EE P Pt T   
where TE is the transport cost of ethanol from Brazil to the United States. The United States 
provides a tax credit (s) to U.S. blenders of ethanol and gasoline, which creates the following 




EE P Ps    
  The United States mandates a fixed volume of ethanol be blended with gasoline under the 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program of the Energy Independence and Security Act 
(EISA) of 2007. For instance, 9 billion gallons of ethanol were required to be blended with 
gasoline in 2008, and this requirement is scheduled to increase to 15 billion gallons by 2022. 
Even though the EISA requires a fixed volume of biofuel to be mixed with gasoline (i.e., a 
consumption mandate), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which is responsible for 
implementing the RFS, requires that ethanol and gasoline be blended in a fixed proportion 
(m). This amounts to a blend mandate. The blend mandate implies that the share of ethanol 
(gasoline) in the final fuel is m (1 − m); hence, 
(6)  and (1 ) ,
UU U U
EF G F D mD D m D    
where  U
F D  is the U.S. demand for final fuel. Thus,  
(7)  (1 ) .
UUU U U
FEG F F D DDm D m D     
  Since final fuel is a weighted average of ethanol and gasoline, the producer price of final 
fuel , () UP
F P is specified as: 
(8) 
,, (1 ) .
UP UC U
FE G P mP m P    
The United States imposes an excise tax (tF) on final fuel, which creates the following wedge 




FF F P Pt   
Combining equations (8) and (9) yields: 
 
(10) 
,, (1 ) .
UC UC U
FE G F P mP m P t   
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Substituting equation (5) into (10) yields: 
(11)   
,, (1 ) .
UC UP U
GF FE P mP s mP t      
  Substituting equations (2), (4), (6), and (11) into the gasoline and ethanol trade equilibrium 
equations (1) and (3) and rearranging terms yields the following results: 
(12)         






GG GG G GG G
mD mP s mP t
SP SP T DP T
   
   
 
(13)        







UU P BU P BU P
EE EE E EE E
mD m P s m P t
SP SP t T DP t T
 
     
 
Equations (12) and (13) contain two unknowns
, (a n d )
U UP
E G PP and form the core equations used 
in this analysis. If the specific functional forms of supply and demand are known, equations 
(12) and (13) can be solved for the equilibrium U.S. ethanol and gasoline prices. We can 
substitute these equilibrium prices into the supply, demand, and price linkage equations to 
obtain other prices and quantities. Similarly, we can solve for the equilibrium prices and 
quantities under free trade. By equating ethanol prices under distortive policies to the ethanol 
price that would exist under a free-trade regime, we can identify the trade policy that would 
establish the free-trade ethanol price under the current U.S. domestic policy regime. 
  When the supply and demand functions are specified in general terms, it is not possible to 
solve the system of two equations explicitly for endogenous variables. In this case, the trade 
equilibrium conditions (12) and (13) can be differentiated to compute the appropriate tariff 
level. The equilibrium ethanol price depends on the exogenous policy parameters: 
, UP




E ts   The tariff (t) corresponding to the tax credit for domestic and imported ethanol 
should be such that
,, (;,) ,
UP UP
EE Pt s P    the free-trade price of ethanol in the United States. 
Thus, the problem is to find the tariff, t, for a given level of subsidy, s, such that the U.S. 
ethanol producer price after the subsidy and tariff is the same as the free-market ethanol price. 
Taking first-order Taylor-series approximation of 
, (;,)
UP
E P ts  around the free-market policies 
(t = s = 0) and making use of
,, (; 0 , 0 )
UP UP





















       
where
,, (/ ) / (/ )
UP UP
EE P sP t     
 is the countervailing coefficient (i.e., the ratio of t to s) 
which determines the magnitude of the specific tariff resulting from one unit of production 
tax credit. 
  The countervailing coefficient  can be solved by conducting a comparative static analysis 
of the trade equilibrium equations (12) and (13) and finding 
,, /a n d / ,
UP UP
EE PsPt    or we 
can solve for 
, UP
E dP to find 
,, /a n d / ,
UP UP















and then compute . We use the second approach here. Equations (12) and (13) are totally 
differentiated to obtain: 
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Applying Cramer’s rule and with further simplification, we can solve for 
, :
UP
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      
      
     
                 
 
The terms on the right-hand side of the above equations are converted to elasticities by 
multiplication and division using prices and quantities and the identities (1 )
UU
FG mD D   and 
m
UU
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 is the U.S. gasoline supply price elasticity,
R
GG 
 is the ROW gasoline supply price 
elasticity,
R
GG  is the ROW gasoline demand elasticity,
U




 is the Brazilian ethanol supply elasticity, and
  B
EE 
 is the Brazilian ethanol demand elasti-
city. 
  Given positive supply elasticities (,, 0 )
URB
GG GG EE     and negative demand elasticities 
( ,
U
FF    ,0 ) ,
RB
GG EE   equation (19) implies that  is negative. Thus, t must also be negative. 
This suggests the United States should provide an import subsidy rather than levy an import 
tariff to maintain the policy-distorted U.S. ethanol producer price at the free-market price. 
The rationale is that the U.S. ethanol tax credit props up the U.S. producer price artificially; if 
the ethanol price were to decline to the free-market level, total ethanol supply for domestic 
use would need to increase. However, domestic production would fall because of the decline 
in the U.S. producer price. Hence, the only way to expand total ethanol supply is to increase 
imports, which can only be accomplished by subsidizing imports, not taxing them. 
  Though the sign of the countervailing coefficient  is negative, the magnitude of  is not 
easily determined. However, we can ascertain the effects of the magnitudes of key parameters 
on  by differentiating  with respect to those parameters. Note that in this analysis,  and the 
demand elasticities (,, a n d)
UB U
GG EE FF   are negative. The comparative static results are as 
follows. First,  /0 , /0 , a n d /0 ;
UR U
GG GG GG           i.e., when gasoline supply in 
the United States and the ROW and gasoline demand in the ROW become more price elastic, 
the import subsidy increases. Second,  /0 a n d /0 ;
BB
EE EE         i.e., when Brazilian 
ethanol supply and demand are more price elastic, the import subsidy decreases. Third, 
/ 0;
U
FF    i.e., when U.S. fuel demand becomes more price elastic, the import subsidy 
increases. Finally,  /0 ; m     i.e., as m increases, the import subsidy also increases. In 
addition, the range of values that  could potentially take on can be evaluated by conducting a 
sensitivity analysis for smaller and larger values of the key elasticity parameters. This issue is 
examined in the empirical analysis provided below. 
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Data and Sources 
 
Implementation of the theoretical model to estimate the countervailing coefficient in equation 
(19) requires parameter values. Since the ethanol market is still in its infancy and undergoing 
structural change, reliable econometric estimates for elasticity parameters are not readily 
available (Gardner, 2003; Elobeid and Tokgoz, 2008). Consequently, elasticity values used in 
previous studies (e.g., Elobeid and Tokgoz, 2008; de Gorter, Just, and Tan, 2009) are utilized 
to estimate the value of . 
  Table 1 reports values of elasticity parameters and their sources, which were obtained from 
an extensive search of the agricultural economics and energy literature pertinent to the U.S., 
Brazilian, and ROW oil and ethanol markets. The own-price demand elasticities for fuel, 
ethanol, and gasoline are generally inelastic. Supply elasticities for gasoline in the United 
States and for ethanol in Brazil are also relatively small (less than 0.2). However, the supply 
elasticity of gasoline in the ROW is relatively large (2.25) because it is based on OPEC 
countries’ supply response, as reported by de Gorter, Just, and Tan (2009). The blend ratio 
(m) for ethanol in gasoline, determined by RFS regulations, is currently 10%. 
  Estimation of the countervailing coefficient () also requires supply, demand, and price 
data. Ethanol and gasoline consumption and production data were obtained from the online 
“International Energy Statistics” database of the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) (2009c); “Country Analysis Briefs: Brazil Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis” (EIA, 
2009b); “Monthly Energy Review, September 2009” (EIA, 2009d); the “Plano Decenal de 
Expansão de Energia 2008/2017—Capítulo VIII” (in Portuguese) of the Empresa de Pesquisa 
Energética (EPE) em estreita vinculação com o Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME) 
(2009); the “Anuário Estatístico Brasileiro do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis” 
(2009, in Portuguese) of the Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis; 
and the “World Oil Outlook 2009” of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC, 2009). 
  Ethanol and gasoline retail and wholesale price data were obtained from the online 
“International Energy Statistics” database of the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA, 2009c); the “Annual Energy Review 2008” (EIA, 2009a); the “Monthly Energy 
Review, September 2009” (EIA, 2009d); the “Energy Prices and Taxes, 2nd Quarter 2009” of 
the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2009); the “Ethanol and Unleaded Gasoline Average 
Rack Prices F.O.B., Omaha, Nebraska, 1882–2009” of the Nebraska Ethanol Board (2009); 
the “Brazil Biofuel Annual Ethanol Report 2009” of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA, 2009); and the “Anuário Estatístico Brasileiro do Petróleo, Gás Natural e 
Biocombustíveis 2009” (in Portuguese) of the Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e 
Biocombustíveis (ANP, 2009). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The value of the countervailing coefficient for the year 2008 was computed by substituting 
the values for the elasticities, mandate, consumption, production, and retail and wholesale 
prices in equation (19). The year 2008 was chosen because that was the year in which the 
mandate was first implemented. Once  is determined, the appropriate value of the import 
tariff is calculated by multiplying  by the tax credit using equation (15). The computed value 
of  is −0.19, and, as the theoretical analyses suggest, implies that the United States should Devadoss and Kuffel  U.S. Import Tariff on Brazilian Ethanol   483 
 








              Source 
Demand Elasticities:      
 U.S.  own-price  elasticity of fuel 
U
FF    −0.80  Gallagher et al., 2003 
  Brazilian own-price elasticity of ethanol 
B
EE    −0.10  Elobeid & Tokgoz, 2008 
  ROW own-price elasticity of gasoline 
R
GG    −0.205  Eltony & Al-Mutairi, 1995 
  U.S. own-price elasticity of ethanol 
U
EE    −0.43  Elobeid & Tokgoz, 2008 
Supply Elasticities:      
 U.S.  own-price  elasticity of fuel 
U
GG    0.15  Elobeid & Tokgoz, 2008 
  Brazilian own-price elasticity of ethanol 
B
EE    0.20  Gallagher et al., 2003 
  ROW own-price elasticity of gasoline 
R
GG    2.25  de Gorter, Just & Tan, 2009 
 
implement an import subsidy. For 2008, the tax credit was $0.46, which translates into an 
import subsidy of $0.09 per gallon [$0.46
 
 (−0.19)]. This means every gallon of ethanol 
imported by the United States from Brazil should receive a subsidy of $0.09, rather than be 
subject to the current import tariff of $0.57. In 2008, the United States imported 434 million 
gallons of ethanol from Brazil (Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association, 2009). These 
imports received the $0.46 per gallon tax credit but incurred the $0.57 per gallon tariff. As a 
result, the United States paid $199.6 million in tax credits but generated $247.4 million in 
tariff revenues from the imports of Brazilian ethanol. The net value of $47.8 million is a gain 
to the United States but a loss to Brazil. Instead of collecting $47.8 million net import tariff 
revenues, the United States should be subsidizing the ethanol imports from Brazil to the tune 
of $39.1 million (434 million gallons multiplied by a per unit import subsidy of $0.09 per 
gallon). 
  The results of this analysis are consistent with the findings of previous studies. As reported 
by de Gorter and Just (2008), Brazil benefits from U.S. free-market policies but incurs losses 
as a result of the tax credit and import tariff. They also note the U.S. argument that an import 
tariff is needed to offset the tax credit and protect the U.S. ethanol industry is unfounded. 
Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) assert that removing the U.S. ethanol import tariff without 
modifying the tax credit should increase ethanol imports and lower U.S. ethanol prices; 
furthermore, removing both policies should decrease U.S. ethanol prices and production, 
increase consumption, and increase imports by almost 200%. Brazilian ethanol production 
and exports are predicted to increase to satisfy the U.S. demand. De Gorter, Just, and Tan 
(2009) conclude that a reduction of the U.S. ethanol import tariff on a level lower than the tax 
credit would increase and stimulate ethanol trade, implying the United States should be 
subsidizing the ethanol imports as supported by our study. 
  To examine the influence of the various parameter values on the countervailing coefficient 
and thus on import subsidy, we conduct a sensitivity analysis by letting the values of 
elasticities range from very inelastic to elastic and the mandate range from 0 to 1. We present 
the empirical results in table 2 and the comparative static results of the theoretical analysis in 
the appendix.   484   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 







U.S. gasoline supply price elasticity  ()
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ROW gasoline demand elasticity  ()
R






ROW gasoline supply price elasticity  ()
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Brazilian ethanol supply elasticity  ()
B





Brazilian ethanol demand elasticity  ()
B






U.S. fuel demand elasticity  ()
U











Notes: This table presents the results of sensitivity analyses by letting various parameters in text equation (19) to vary. 
These parameters are given in column 1. The elasticity parameters range in absolute values from inelastic (0.01) to 
elastic (10), and the blend mandate ranges from 0 to 1. The values of the parameters are given in column 2. The 
computed values of  corresponding to these parameters are reported in column 3. 
 
  The value of the countervailing coefficient is not overly sensitive to U.S. gasoline supply 
elasticity and ROW gasoline supply and demand elasticities. For example, as these elasticities 
become elastic, the value of  converges to −0.21, which is very close to the value of −0.19 
obtained from the benchmark elasticities reported in table 1. When U.S. gasoline supply 
elasticity and ROW gasoline demand elasticities are very inelastic, a value of −0.19 is 
obtained for , which is identical to its value for the benchmark elasticities. This finding 
suggests that for a given tax credit, the import subsidy does not change much. As the ROW 
gasoline supply elasticity becomes inelastic,  approaches −0.08. 
  As Brazilian ethanol supply and demand elasticities become very elastic, the value of  
approaches zero. This is because the Brazilian excess supply curve becomes increasingly 
elastic; when the United States faces a very elastic (horizontal) excess supply curve, it operates 
as a small country and its policies have no effect on ethanol prices in Brazil. Since the 
Brazilian price is not impacted, the ethanol imports from Brazil do not need any import 
subsidy. As the Brazilian ethanol demand elasticity becomes inelastic, it does not have a 
significant impact on the value of  because the elasticity of the Brazilian excess supply curve 
is largely determined by the Brazilian domestic supply elasticity. However, as the Brazilian 
domestic supply curve becomes less price elastic, the impact on  is relatively large because 
the Brazilian excess supply function becomes more price inelastic. Consequently, to increase 
Brazilian prices, the United States needs to provide a larger import subsidy and the value of  
is a large negative. 
  As U.S. demand for fuel becomes more price elastic,  increases in absolute terms. The 
rationale for this result is that the U.S. excess demand for gasoline and ethanol also becomes 
more price elastic, which makes Brazil more like a small exporting country in the ethanol Devadoss and Kuffel  U.S. Import Tariff on Brazilian Ethanol   485 
 
market. Consequently, Brazil bears the full effect of U.S. ethanol policy changes, which 
means the tariff needs to decline and become a large negative for the U.S. ethanol price to 
reach the free-market price. If U.S. fuel demand elasticity is very inelastic, then  tends to 
zero. This implies that irrespective of the magnitude of the tax credit, the tariff/import subsidy 
will be close to zero, and U.S. ethanol policies do not have any bearing on the import tariff. 
 If  m is close to zero, the role of the mandate is less important because ethanol is not a 
significant component of the fuel market and the U.S. will not be a major player in the world 
ethanol market. In this case, the value of  is close to zero, indicating that for a given tax 
credit the import subsidy would also be near zero. For instance, an ethanol content of 6.97% 
(based on 2008 EIA data) results in a  value of −0.13. In contrast, as m increases (i.e., 
m
 →
 1), the ethanol market becomes large relative to the gasoline market, and the United 
States becomes an even larger player in the world ethanol market. As a result, U.S. policies 
have a greater impact on the world ethanol market, which implies, for a given tax credit, the 
ethanol import subsidy will increase as m increases to maintain the free-trade price for U.S. 
ethanol. 
  When the ethanol market is viewed as independent of the gasoline market, the value for  
is computed using equation (20), which increases to −1.14; the corresponding import subsidy 
is $0.52. When only the ethanol market is considered, the import subsidy is larger because the 




The United States and Brazil are currently the two largest ethanol producers in the world. The 
United States has articulated two energy policy goals: (a) to become energy independent and 
(b) to reduce carbon emissions. However, studies have shown that U.S. biofuel policies do 
more to increase farm income from corn production than to reduce GHG emissions. For 
instance, Miranowski (2007) concludes that under the U.S. domestic farm subsidy program, 
U.S. corn-ethanol production would never have been feasible without biofuel subsidies. In 
contrast, Brazil has a comparative advantage in producing sugar-based ethanol, which is more 
energy efficient and eco-friendly than corn-based ethanol (Kojima, Mitchell, and Ward, 
2007). Furthermore, sugar-based ethanol can directly compete with gasoline without subsidies 
as a renewable energy alternative. Sugar ethanol in Brazil cost only $2.62 per gallon in 2008; 
in contrast, the price of corn ethanol in the United States was $3.44 per gallon. In addition, 
sugar ethanol offers higher energy benefits than corn ethanol (Rajagopal and Zilberman, 
2007). Moreover, Brazilian ethanol is competitive with gasoline when crude oil is priced at 
between $29 and $35 per barrel, but U.S. ethanol is competitive only between $44 and $50 
per barrel (Motaal, 2008; Von Lampe, 2006). Consequently, Brazil has a comparative advan-
tage in producing ethanol from sugarcane and is competitive in spite of a high U.S. import 
tariff. Nevertheless, U.S. trade barriers restrict the use of the more environmentally beneficial 
sugar-based ethanol. 
  These findings support the view that the U.S. ethanol import tariff is designed to protect U.S. 
ethanol producers—who cannot produce ethanol as cost-effectively as Brazilian producers—
and increase the demand for U.S. corn. Therefore, the current U.S. import tariff policy is 
inconsistent with the U.S. goals of reducing reliance on imported petroleum and reducing 
GHG emissions (Johnson and Runge, 2007). Though U.S. corn-based ethanol is promoted 
as  a clean alternative for fossil fuel, recent research has identified possible negative 486   December 2010  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
environmental impacts; in addition, the U.S. ethanol mandate has had adverse effects on food 
prices (Searchinger et al., 2008; Escobar et al., 2009). 
  This study presents evidence that the current U.S. ethanol import tariff in excess of the tax 
credit is not justified and the United States should consider providing an import subsidy. 
Furthermore, global emissions will decline if there is freer trade in ethanol due to Brazil’s 
comparative advantage in producing energy-efficient and environmentally beneficial sugar 
ethanol (de Gorter, Just, and Tan, 2009). In addition, eliminating the U.S. import tariff should 
increase competition and bring innovations in efficiency and production to the global ethanol 
industry. 
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